{"id":4507,"date":"2026-11-14T15:15:15","date_gmt":"2026-11-14T15:15:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/amercanfirstfinance.com\/?p=4507"},"modified":"2026-11-14T15:15:15","modified_gmt":"2026-11-14T15:15:15","slug":"eu-tax-omnibus-proposal-seeks-to-overhaul-withholding-taxes-and-harmonization-rules-warns-tax-foundation-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/amercanfirstfinance.com\/?p=4507","title":{"rendered":"EU Tax Omnibus Proposal Seeks to Overhaul Withholding Taxes and Harmonization Rules, Warns Tax Foundation Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>Note: The following is an adaptation of the written testimony submitted by Martha Caziero, Head of Policy at Tax Foundation Europe, to the European Commission.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Tax Foundation Europe has released a detailed review of the European Commission\u2019s Tax Omnibus proposal, highlighting critical implications for economic growth, legal certainty, and competitiveness across the European Union. The organization\u2019s official input focuses on selected elements of the sweeping legislative package currently under discussion at the Council of the European Union, specifically addressing the elimination of holding requirements for withholding tax exemptions and the ambiguous nature of harmonization standards under the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD).<\/p>\n<h3>Introduction<\/h3>\n<p>The core mission of Tax Foundation Europe centers on developing rigorous economic research and educating policymakers on tax matters that directly influence the growth and competitiveness of the European Union economy. In line with this objective, the organization\u2019s recent review of the Tax Omnibus proposal is not a comprehensive audit, but rather a targeted examination of specific provisions that hold the greatest potential to affect cross-border investment and internal market dynamics.<\/p>\n<p>The analysis centers on two primary issues. First, it investigates the proposed elimination of holding requirements from the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (PSD) and the Interest and Royalty Directive (IRD), which are designed to extend withholding tax exemptions on dividend, interest, and royalty payments. Second, it evaluates the structural nature of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) and whether its provisions serve as a genuine minimum standard for protecting Member States&#8217; tax bases or inadvertently drift toward rigid maximum harmonization.<\/p>\n<h3>PSD and IRD\u2019s Elimination of the Holding Requirement<\/h3>\n<p>Under current European tax law, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive establish distinct ownership prerequisites that equity, debt, and intellectual property rights holders must satisfy to secure exemptions from withholding taxes. Specifically, the PSD mandates that a parent company must hold a minimum direct or indirect shareholding of 10 percent in its subsidiary. Meanwhile, the IRD requires associated companies to maintain a connection of at least 25 percent through direct shareholdings or via a common parent company. <\/p>\n<p>For shareholding arrangements falling beneath these designated thresholds\u2014and subject to the overarching provisions of the EU Treaties\u2014individual Member States retain the sovereign authority to levy withholding taxes on the relevant cross-border payments. The European Commission\u2019s Tax Omnibus proposal seeks to abolish these thresholds entirely. Should the amendment pass, Member States would lose their legal freedom to impose withholding taxes on cross-border payments directed toward portfolio investments, defined as holdings residing below the 10 percent and 25 percent markers.<\/p>\n<p>National governments have voiced significant concerns regarding this shift, arguing that the amendment fundamentally alters the original purpose of the PSD and IRD. Originally designed to facilitate the grouping of corporate entities within the single market, the directives would instead function as mechanisms for reallocating taxing rights among Member States. Because this reallocation would impact national budgets unevenly, the proposal carries the distinct risk of creating asymmetrical fiscal consequences across the bloc.<\/p>\n<h3>Definitive Double Taxation on Portfolio Investments Despite EU Court of Justice Case-Law and Double Tax Conventions<\/h3>\n<p>For equity, debt, and intellectual property holdings not covered by the current ownership thresholds, Member States remain fully empowered to levy withholding taxes on outbound payments. In the case of dividend distributions, this legal reality can readily trigger a damaging cycle of triple taxation. <\/p>\n<p>The mechanism unfolds in three distinct stages. First, the profits generated by the distributing company are subjected to corporate income tax within its home state of residence. Second, the state of the distributing company levies a withholding tax on the specific amount of dividends distributed to the external shareholder. Third, the receiving company is taxed once again in its own state of residence, as the incoming dividends are incorporated directly into its corporate income tax base.<\/p>\n<p>For interest and royalty payments, the process routinely results in juridical double taxation. Initially, the interest and royalties received by the corporate entity are taxed via withholding mechanisms enforced by the state of the paying company. Subsequently, those same financial streams are taxed a second time when they enter the corporate tax base of the receiving company in its state of residence.<\/p>\n<p>EU law places definitive boundaries on the power of Member States to levy these outbound charges. Under the doctrine of fundamental freedoms, EU law requires national tax authorities to treat resident and non-resident taxpayers identically whenever they find themselves in comparable economic situations. <\/p>\n<p>For dividend payments, this legal constraint prevents Member States from levying withholding taxes on all outbound dividend streams while simultaneously granting exemptions or tax credits exclusively to domestic recipients. In the simplest legal scenario, a Member State that exempts domestic corporate dividends from corporate income tax cannot legally turn around and levy a withholding tax on dividends paid to recipients abroad.<\/p>\n<p>Regarding interest and royalties, granting national treatment to non-residents generally requires source Member States that levy withholding taxes to account for the expenses directly connected to that specific income, taxing the net amount in the same manner applied to domestic residents. However, because destination states typically subject all received interest and royalties to standard corporate taxation regardless of their domestic or foreign origin, equal treatment rules fail to resolve the underlying juridical double taxation.<\/p>\n<p>This structural divide demonstrates that EU fundamental freedoms constrain outbound withholding taxes far more strictly for dividends than for interest and royalties. The distinction persists because dividends represent distributions of after-tax profits that are customarily exempted upon receipt, whereas interest and royalty payments function as deductible business expenses for the paying entity and taxable income for the recipient.<\/p>\n<p>Bilateral double tax conventions (DTCs) established between Member States introduce additional layers of limitation. Typically, these treaties restrict the maximum withholding tax rate that a paying state can impose and obligate the residence state of the receiving company to grant a tax credit for the foreign tax paid at source. <\/p>\n<p>Despite these safeguards under EU law and tax treaties, instances of definitive double taxation continue to plague the internal market. To the extent that source states maintain non-discriminatory rules between residents and non-residents, they can lawfully levy withholding taxes that comply with EU law, leaving double tax treaties unable to provide relief. Complex multilateral scenarios, such as triangular structures or divergent interpretations of treaty terms by partner nations, routinely generate intractable instances of double taxation within the Union.<\/p>\n<h3>Even When Credited, Withholding Tax Refunds\u2019 Administrative Costs Deter Free Movement<\/h3>\n<p>Empirical evidence does not clearly indicate that the mere existence of definitive withholding taxes directly dictates where investors choose to locate their capital. Nevertheless, the administrative requirements tied to exemptions granted under domestic law, EU directives, or bilateral tax treaties create substantial friction. <\/p>\n<p>Because verifying compliance with exemption rules takes time, Member States frequently levy their higher statutory withholding rates upfront, forcing investors to request refunds for the over-withheld amounts later. This recovery process involves considerable time lags. Extensive administrative burdens and protracted processing delays are strongly correlated with suppressed investment activity. Consequently, the higher the recovery costs associated with recapturing over-withheld taxes, the more likely investors are to bypass a given jurisdiction, ultimately impairing the efficiency of the internal market.<\/p>\n<h3>No Convincing Case to Limit the Exemption to Controlling Shareholdings<\/h3>\n<p>The current restriction limiting withholding tax exemptions to direct, controlling shareholdings\u2014namely holdings above 10 percent for the PSD and 25 percent for the IRD\u2014lacks a compelling economic justification. Historically, the 25 percent threshold was loosely modeled after substantial minority rights recognized under the corporate laws of several Member States. However, the subsequent reduction of the PSD threshold to 10 percent appears entirely arbitrary.<\/p>\n<p>Scholars have long questioned why direct holdings should enjoy preferential tax treatment over portfolio investments. The commentary accompanying the OECD Model Convention suggests that preferential treatment for direct holdings is necessary to prevent recurrent taxation and encourage international investment. Yet, this logic applies with equal force to portfolio investments. A dividend or interest payment suffers double taxation regardless of the underlying percentage of share ownership, facing taxation once at the source via withholding and again at the destination via corporate income tax.<\/p>\n<p>A more defensible policy argument rests on the principle of neutrality between establishing a foreign subsidiary and operating abroad through a permanent establishment. Because a permanent establishment shares a single legal identity with its head office, internal financial transfers do not constitute dividend distributions and escape dividend withholding taxes. Granting withholding tax exemptions to direct holdings neutralizes the tax incentive that might otherwise push businesses toward choosing permanent establishments over subsidiaries.<\/p>\n<p>However, extending this exemption to portfolio investments would not compromise that objective. By eliminating withholding taxes across all dividend payments, both permanent establishments and corporate subsidiaries would maintain equal treatment, while portfolio investors would finally be spared from a double layer of taxation.<\/p>\n<h3>Asymmetrical Revenue Impact on the Member States<\/h3>\n<p>The fiscal fallout of the Tax Omnibus proposal would vary widely across Member States, depending on whether\u2014and on what specific categories of income\u2014they currently levy statutory withholding taxes. Statutory rules alone, however, provide an incomplete picture of the proposal&#8217;s ultimate effect on public revenues.<\/p>\n<p>As noted previously, EU law and bilateral tax conventions severely restrict the capacity of source states to levy withholding taxes. Furthermore, capital-exporting nations routinely provide tax credits for foreign withholding taxes paid at source, meaning that capital-importing countries retain the actual revenue collected from those withholdings. Consequently, abolishing outbound withholding taxes will yield positive revenue impacts for capital-exporting states while generating negative revenue impacts for capital-importing nations.<\/p>\n<p>Data compiled through Eurostat\u2019s balance of payments statistics reveals a clear geographical divide. Net exporters of portfolio investments include Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Latvia. Conversely, net importers of portfolio investments comprise Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Austria, Finland, and Czechia.<\/p>\n<p>While these aggregate figures encompass assets and liabilities held both within and outside the European Union, the data indicates that the Tax Omnibus proposal will primarily impact capital-importing countries that currently rely on withholding taxes for portfolio investments. Capital-exporting nations that previously absorbed the cost of foreign tax credits, such as Italy and Germany, stand to experience net revenue gains.<\/p>\n<h3>Mitigating the Revenue Shortfall: A Revenue-Sharing Clause or an EU Own Resource<\/h3>\n<p>The prospect of asymmetrical revenue losses has emerged as a primary objection raised by several Member States. Critics argue that permitting cross-border flows to proceed untaxed in the source country converts the directives into instruments that unilaterally transfer taxing rights to the residence Member States.<\/p>\n<p>While the mere reallocation of taxing powers has no intrinsic impact on overall economic growth, maintaining inefficient tax allocation rules certainly does. Lengthy refund procedures for over-withheld taxes and persistent instances of double taxation continue to stifle cross-border investment within the single market. Streamlining these rules by removing source-state withholding obligations represents a clear economic advancement.<\/p>\n<p>Nevertheless, eliminating withholding taxes does not inherently require an uneven fiscal burden. Historical precedent exists for balancing these adjustments; the now-repealed EU Savings Directive utilized a transitional withholding mechanism that required source states to share 25 percent of their collected revenues with residence states, which retained the remaining 75 percent.<\/p>\n<p>Drawing inspiration from this model, the Council could incorporate a revenue-sharing clause into the directives. Under this mechanism, capital-exporting countries that experience financial gains from the proposal would transfer all or part of those windfalls to capital-importing nations facing revenue deficits. <\/p>\n<p>Because tracking every individual dividend, interest, and royalty payment would prove administratively impossible, the transfer could be executed using a statistical formula. The formula would estimate annual returns on aggregate equity and debt assets held across Member States, subsequently applying specific rates to calculate the required financial transfers from capital-exporting to capital-importing jurisdictions.<\/p>\n<p>For dividend flows, a proposed rate of 2.34 percent applied to the assumed equity return would approximate the average maximum withholding tax that a Member State could lawfully impose under European Court of Justice case-law. This figure is derived by multiplying the average EU corporate income tax rate by the average share of domestic dividends that remains taxable in the hands of corporate recipients after accounting for domestic exemptions. For interest and royalty income, a flat rate of 6 percent based on average treaty-based withholding rates within the EU offers a practical benchmark.<\/p>\n<p>An alternative approach with a clearer EU-wide rationale would treat these amounts as an EU own resource. Rather than directly subsidizing individual national budgets, the forgone revenue would be redirected to finance common European expenditures. Only capital-exporting countries would contribute to this funding mechanism, as they are the primary beneficiaries of no longer having to credit foreign withholding taxes. For these nations, the arrangement would remain broadly revenue-neutral compared to the status quo. Capital-importing countries, while losing direct withholding collections, would benefit collectively from the redirection of capital-exporting revenues toward the EU budget rather than foreign tax credits.<\/p>\n<h3>The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive as a Minimum Standard<\/h3>\n<p>Article 3 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) explicitly establishes that the directive serves merely as a minimum standard for protecting Member States&#8217; tax bases, permitting national governments to implement stricter domestic measures provided they comply with EU Treaties. However, the Tax Omnibus proposal introduces wording that directly calls this baseline principle into question.<\/p>\n<p>The controlled foreign company (CFC) provisions and interest limitation rules within the proposal contain ambiguous language that threatens to restrict the ability of Member States to exceed the baseline standards. While new exclusions from the CFC rules appear mandatory, it remains entirely unclear whether the same mandatory status applies to Model A or the one-third passive income exclusion. Although the proposal uses mandatory formulations such as &quot;Member States shall,&quot; it lacks an explicit prohibition against national divergence, creating deep legal uncertainty.<\/p>\n<p>This contradictory drafting exposes Member States and taxpayers to conflicting legal signals. Article 3 guarantees the right to adopt stricter national standards, yet specific CFC provisions expressly prohibit divergence, and other clauses utilize mandatory language without clarifying their legal scope. This ambiguity undermines the fundamental harmonization goals intended under Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ultimately threatening legal certainty and the broader competitiveness of the European tax system.<\/p>\n<p>To resolve this conflict, Tax Foundation Europe recommends amending ATAD Article 3 to clarify that the directive establishes a minimum standard of protection &quot;unless otherwise provided.&quot; Under this framework, the minimum standard would operate as the default rule, while explicit provisions utilizing mandatory language would function as maximum harmonization measures. Additionally, the CFC provisions should be streamlined either by removing express prohibitions and standardizing terminology or by explicitly extending mandatory status to all relevant paragraphs.<\/p>\n<h3>The R&amp;D Full Expensing as Minimum Harmonization<\/h3>\n<p>Similar ambiguities surround the newly introduced R&amp;D full expensing provision, which the proposal designates as a minimum harmonization measure. This classification allows Member States to maintain or introduce alternative domestic regimes if they deem them more favorable than the EU-wide baseline. However, national governments have expressed widespread confusion regarding how to accurately assess equivalence.<\/p>\n<p>The R&amp;D full expensing rule requires Member States to let taxpayers deduct qualifying R&amp;D capital expenditures directly from their taxable base either in the year of acquisition or spread across a maximum of four years. Provided they avoid state aid violations, Member States could theoretically extend full expensing to a broader array of asset classes or lengthen application windows. Yet, given the vast array of existing national R&amp;D incentives, governments remain uncertain whether their domestic tools genuinely surpass the proposal&#8217;s standards.<\/p>\n<p>Traditional depreciation schedules force businesses to recover investment costs over extended periods reflecting an asset&#8217;s useful lifespan. Because inflation and the time value of money erode the real value of these delayed deductions over time, traditional depreciation artificially raises the cost of capital. Full expensing eliminates this penalty by allowing immediate write-offs, aligning nominal deductions with real economic costs.<\/p>\n<p>Consequently, a reliable criterion for evaluating the equivalence of domestic R&amp;D incentives would be the net present value of the allowed deductions. If a domestic rule allows taxpayers to recover at least the real value of their initial capital investment\u2014such as through neutral cost recovery systems that adjust for inflation and capital returns\u2014the measure qualifies as economically equivalent.<\/p>\n<p>Nevertheless, relying on a minimum harmonization floor risks defeating the overarching goal of regulatory harmonization. If the primary objective is to eliminate disparate R&amp;D incentives across the EU, permitting a proliferation of economically equivalent national alternatives may fail to deliver uniform conditions. Clarifying the precise scope of the R&amp;D full expensing provision and defining acceptable alternative regimes will be vital to ensuring the measure fulfills its economic purpose.<\/p>\n<h3>Conclusions<\/h3>\n<p>Tax Foundation Europe views the Tax Omnibus proposal as a constructive step toward improving the efficiency of the internal market, provided key legal ambiguities are addressed. Eliminating holding thresholds for withholding tax exemptions has the potential to boost cross-border investment, particularly if paired with streamlined administrative procedures for claiming relief. While adjustments to the IRD will inevitably shift taxing rights toward residence Member States, the resulting fiscal imbalances can be effectively mitigated through statistical revenue-sharing mechanisms or by integrating the funds into the EU own resources framework. <\/p>\n<p>At the same time, lawmakers must clarify the interaction between ATAD amendments and minimum harmonization standards. Explicitly distinguishing between mandatory and optional rules in both Article 3 and the CFC provisions, alongside establishing clear economic benchmarks for R&amp;D full expensing, will be essential to safeguarding legal certainty and fostering long-term economic growth across the European Union.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Note: The following is an adaptation of the written testimony submitted by Martha Caziero, Head of Policy at Tax Foundation Europe, to the European Commission. Tax Foundation Europe has released a detailed review of the European Commission\u2019s Tax Omnibus proposal, highlighting critical implications for economic growth, legal certainty, and competitiveness across the European Union. 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