Wednesday, October 28, 2026
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Law Students Expose the Hidden Flaws in Appellate Briefs Through Critical Editing Exercise

Raul Delapena Setiawan
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For generations, entering the legal profession has come with a heavy dose of imposter syndrome. When law students read their first appellate briefs written by experienced practitioners, the initial reaction is rarely skepticism; instead, it is a quiet, self-deprecating assumption of inadequacy. Faced with dense, winding prose and labyrinthine arguments, students commonly suspect that their own lack of comprehension reveals a personal intellectual deficit.

However, a revealing pedagogical exercise assigned to upper-division law students by legal writing expert Bryan A. Garner suggests that practicing lawyers might want to consider an alternative explanation. Sometimes, the reader has not failed the prose. The prose has failed the reader.

For years, Garner has given his advanced law students an overnight assignment designed to put them on the receiving end of professional advocacy. The exercise is straightforward yet eye-opening: students are instructed to visit an appellate court’s website, find a filed legal brief, examine its issue statements, and rewrite one. To successfully complete the task, the student must locate the argument’s primary major and minor premises—the argued-for rules and the specific facts that make those rules applicable. The conjunction of these elements must lead naturally to a cogently stated question.

Furthermore, the revision must adhere to strict constraints. It must make immediate sense to a reasonably intelligent high-school student, reach the question mark by the 75th word, and make every single word and syllable contribute to crystallizing the core legal problem. Finally, the students are asked to reflect on what they observed during the process.

The resulting observations from the students are consistently enlightening, often poignant, and occasionally devastating to the mystique of traditional legal writing. One student expressed genuine surprise at the sheer number of appellate briefs that are next to impossible to understand. Another found the experience extremely distressing in light of what they had been taught in lectures about clarity and precision.

Yet, these students are far from indiscriminate faultfinders. One student noted feeling somewhat uncharitable when correcting a brief that had been chosen precisely because it was generally well-written and easy to understand. Its fundamental intelligibility was what made the revision possible in the first place. By contrast, other briefs reviewed by the class were so muddled that the students could not even identify the core legal issue they were supposed to clarify. As the exercise demonstrates, a practicing lawyer might reasonably prefer the indignity of editorial correction to the dubious distinction of being completely beyond comprehension.

Students naturally enter law school assuming that practicing lawyers know exactly what they are doing and why they are doing it. A filed court brief acquires the spurious authority of an accomplished fact: someone wrote it, signed it, and entrusted a client’s serious legal interests to it. Surely, the student reasons, its peculiarities must serve some deep, strategic purpose. Perhaps an impenetrable sentence reflects a subtle tactical maneuver. Perhaps providing a missing explanation would somehow insult the court.

One student even checked local circuit rules to discover whether bizarre formatting and convoluted structures were somehow compulsory. Another preserved unwieldy formulations simply because they believed legal minds far brighter than theirs had crafted them.

Then comes the emancipating discovery that changes how these future attorneys view the profession: these attributes are not sacrosanct. Professional legal judgment begins precisely where indiscriminate deference ends. While experience may explain a stylistic choice, it does not necessarily vindicate it. A lawyer can perpetuate a bad habit for thirty years without it becoming any sounder in actual practice.

These students stand at a revealing threshold. Soon, they will transition from the classroom to the ranks of the people filing briefs. In the meantime, they are discovering firsthand what reading those briefs actually means to a harried law clerk or an appellate judge.

One student found a bare, isolated question on page ten, the relevant factual background tucked away on page fourteen, and the governing law split across pages twenty-one and twenty-two. Another student supplied a blunt verdict on the experience: it felt entirely like the writer wanted the reader to do her work for her. Everything necessary to understand the case might technically be somewhere inside the document, but as Garner points out, so it is in a warehouse.

A clear example of this phenomenon emerged from a Connecticut marshal’s fee dispute reviewed during the course. The original brief opened with a stark, unhelpful question: "Was Marshal Marcusi entitled to a 15% fee under the terms of Conn. Gen. Stat. section 52-261a(a)(F)?" A second question supplied a crucial circumstance—namely, that the judgment creditor, not the marshal, had actively pursued the legal proceedings that actually produced the money.

However, neither question explained the underlying statutory language that made this division of labor legally significant. Fifteen percent of what amount? For performing which specific service? Must the marshal personally procure the collection of funds, or is merely serving the initial writ enough?

The reader is given a factual contrast without the legal proposition needed to evaluate it. Instead of exposing the statute’s interpretive fork in the road, the lawyer merely points down the general highway toward the statute and leaves the court to find the junction on its own. This style of writing is not truly an issue statement; it is a research assignment disguised as advocacy—featuring a name, a percentage, a statutory address, and requiring significant assembly by the reader.

What can lawyers learn from law students?

When a student dug deeper, they found what the lawyer’s bare question had effectively concealed: a direct dispute about who must legally do the collecting. The student brought the true issue into sharp focus within a tightened 75-word parameter:

"Connecticut law allows a marshal a 15% fee when ‘money is actually collected and paid over, or the debt or a portion of the debt is secured by the officer.’ Marshal Marcusi served a writ of execution but did nothing further for four years. The creditor collected the money through its own efforts. Does ‘by the officer’ modify both alternatives, requiring Marcusi himself to procure recovery, or only the second, allowing him a fee here?"

The student’s breakthrough was connecting the claimed financial commission directly to the actual work performed. The statutory language then exposed the true interpretive hinge of the case: Does the phrase "by the officer" reach backward across the word "or"? What began as an ambiguous invitation to look something up had transformed into a focused, intellectually honest question worth deciding.

Crucially, the student’s revision did not magically resolve the underlying statutory ambiguity itself. Instead, it accomplished something far more useful at this preliminary stage of litigation: it made the ambiguity impossible for the court to miss. Whether the marshal must personally accomplish collection was no longer treated as a vague gap in the explanation; rather, it became the precise question requiring a judicial decision.

The reader can now examine competing constructions instead of excavating the controversy from a pile of unorganized prose. Clear writing does not abolish inherent legal difficulty. Instead, it successfully separates the difficulty that is genuinely inherent in the law from the artificial difficulty inflicted upon the reader by the lawyer.

The exercise thus serves as an audit of legal reasoning, rather than merely an exercise in verbal economy. Compressing a rambling argument brought one student to an uncomfortable but valuable realization: they were originally trying to prove up the wrong thing entirely. The editorial scissors had functioned as a diagnostic instrument.

At the same time, true economy does not mean indiscriminate amputation. Shortening an already terse statement made one student’s draft less clear and less pleasant to read or hear. Another student repeatedly revised the factual summary because the existing version would have actively misled a first-time reader about the true nature of the underlying case.

That is precisely the right kind of professional anxiety. The assignment is not intended to reward whoever leaves behind the fewest words, nor does it favor the most convenient account of events. A lucid misrepresentation remains a misrepresentation. The ongoing challenge for the advocate is to omit what the reader does not need without suppressing what the reader would actually require to disagree intelligently. Brevity earns no exemption from professional candor.

The students also learned to distinguish genuine persuasion from indiscriminate belligerence. One participant noticed that many practicing lawyers are simply too keen to include any piece of background information that casts their opponents in a bad light, resulting in the burial of truly important legal issues. The novice law student had recognized what the veterans apparently had not: making someone look bad and showing why someone should legally lose are entirely different undertakings.

Another student deplored opposing briefs that resembled ships passing in the night, expressing a clear preference for fair constructions of opposing arguments followed by direct, intellectual confrontation. These students were not asking lawyers to abandon robust advocacy; they were simply asking them to identify the actual disagreement and have the courage to address it head-on.

Ultimately, the most valuable criticism generated by the assignment turned inward. One student admitted to having previously assumed that poor issue drafting was merely an irritant, only to discover that it posed serious challenges to understanding the substantive legal arguments at play. That realization was followed by a candid professional confession: a bad habit of assuming that first drafts are close enough and simply moving on.

That mindset represents the professional danger in miniature—not necessarily a lack of legal knowledge, but rather a state of premature satisfaction. By participating in Garner’s exercise, the student had caught the bad habit before it ever had the chance to acquire a formal letterhead.

Whatever momentary disillusionment this rigorous homework assignment produces, it ultimately fosters something much healthier for the legal profession: the sobering recognition that the writing failures students readily deplore in others are the very temptations they themselves will soon have to resist in practice.

As the principal at LawProse Inc., Bryan A. Garner has taught more than 3,500 continuing legal education classes over the past 36 years. He now incorporates into his professional seminars advanced instruction on using modern artificial intelligence tools effectively.

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